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Consent to sex matters because it can transform coitus from being among the
most heinous of criminal offenses into sex that is of no concern at all to the
criminal law. Unfortunately, the normative task of making the law of rape more
just is commonly impaired by conceptual confusion about what "consent" means.
Consent is both a single concept in law and a multitude of opposing and cross-
cutting conceptions of which courts and commentators tend to be only dimly
aware. Thus, consent can be a mental state on a woman's part, an expression by
her, or both, it can consist of facts about a woman's mental state or expressive
conduct that do not necessarily constitute a defense to rape, or only such facts as
do constitute a defense to rape; and it can consist offacts about a woman's mental
state or expressive conduct, or a legal fiction of such facts. In so far as we are
unaware of the ways in which this conceptual framework structures the way we
think about consent, we risk confusing ourselves and others in undertaking to make
the law of rape more just. Some examples are (1) confusion as to whether the
defense of consent ought to be deemed to consist of a mental state on a woman s
part or an expression; (2) confusion about the relationship between consent to
sexual intercourse and resistance to it; and (3) confusion about the relationship
between force and non-consent.
I. COMMON CONFUSIONS ABOUT CONSENT
Consent arises in various forms in law. It arises in the law of contracts in the
form of promises. It arises in property law in the form of assignments of interests.
And it arises in torts and criminal law as defenses to wrongdoing. These are all
instances of "consent," and, as such, they share things in common. But they also
contain differences--differences that can be framed in Hohfeldian terms:
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" A legal promise by a person, Bill, to another, Susan, creates a
Hohfeldian "right" in Susan, that is, it creates in Bill an enforceable
"duty" to Susan to act in a certain way.
" A legal assignment of a property interest by Bill to Susan creates a
Hohfeldian "power" in Susan, that is, it vests Susan as possessor of
the interest with the authority to change the legal relationships of
others.
* In contrast, when a person, Bill, legally consents to conduct by
another, Susan, that would otherwise constitute a tort or crime by
Susan against Bill, Bill's consent creates a Hohfeldian "privilege" in
Susan. Susan's privilege is not a right that Bill behave in a certain
way in the future. Nor is it a power by which Susan may change the
legal relationships of others. Rather, the privilege that Bill's consent
creates in Susan in torts and criminal law is the negation of a
Hohfeldian duty that Susan would otherwise have to Bill: Bill's
consent negates a legally enforceable obligation that Susan would
otherwise have to Bill to refrain from engaging in the conduct.'
If I were able, I would analyze consent in all its forms. However, because
consent in contracts and property differs significantly from consent in criminal law
and torts, and because my expertise is confined to criminal law, I shall confine
myself to addressing the privilege of consent in criminal cases and, specifically, in
the area of criminal law in which it is most often litigated, i.e., rape cases.
As students of the law of rape, we care about the defense of consent because
of the normative function it performs. Consent possesses what Heidi Hurd calls
the normative "magic" to transform sexual intercourse from being conduct that is
second only to murder in its heinousness into being conduct that is criminally
innocuous.2 Consent matters because to locate consent with respect to sexual
intercourse is to locate the normative boundary between criminal rape and non-
criminal sex. Unfortunately, when commentators and lawmakers undertake the
normative task of distinguishing criminal rape and non-criminal sex, they
sometimes stumble over something that is analytically anterior to their normative
inquiry. They unwittingly stumble over what I call the "conceptual apparatus of
consent"--that is, they unwittingly fail to negotiate the categories of thought by
which we reason about consent. They mistakenly think of consent as solely a
generic concept, when, in reality, the concept of consent in our popular and legal
culture also encompasses three pairs of contrasting and cross-cutting conceptions
of consent, each constituted by its own normative presuppositions. By overlooking
See generally WESLEY HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919).
2 Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, in 2 LEGAL THEORY 121 (1996).
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the existence of these competing conceptions of consent, and by conflating the
nature or normative presuppositions of one conception of consent with another,
they fail to think and speak clearly about how they mean to be distinguishing rape
from sex.
My aim in this essay is analytical. Without taking a position myself on what
distinguishes rape from sex, I hope to sharpen the tools of thought with which it is
done. I will proceed in three parts: In Part II, I will try to identify the three pairs of
contrasting conceptions of consent that underlie debates about consent. In Part III,
I will examine the failure of commentators and lawmakers to understand the
normative presuppositions of one of those pairs of contrasting conceptions,
namely, the contrast between "consent" as subjective state of mind and "consent"
as an objective expression. And in Part IV, I will examine two confusions that I
believe result from conflating another pair of contrasting conceptions, namely, the
contrast between "consent" as an empirical fact and "consent" as a legal judgment.
II. THREE PAIRS OF COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF CONSENT
When we speak of "consent" as a defense to rape, we use a term that
simultaneously refers to both a single generic concept and a multitude of specific
conceptions (although we are not always clear either to ourselves or others as to
which specific conception we have in mind). Generically, to "consent" to sexual
intercourse in law is to acquiesce to the intercourse in some way, whether by virtue
of doing so subjectively, objectively, or as a matter of law. Specifically, to
"consent" to sexual intercourse in law is to acquiesce to it in one or more particular
ways. The particular ways in which one consents to sexual intercourse range
across three pairs of contrasting and cross-cutting conceptions of acquiescence.
A. "Factual" Consent versus "Legal" Consent
To say in law that a woman "consents" to sexual intercourse is ambiguous
because "consent" has two contrasting meanings in law. The contrast is between a
woman's factually acquiescing to sexual intercourse and her legally acquiescing to
it. A woman "factually" consents to sexual intercourse when, whether in mind or
expression, she actually chooses sexual intercourse as that which she
unconditionally desires for herself, as that which she prefers for herself under the
circumstances in which she believes herself to be, or as that about which she is
sufficiently indifferent to it as to be willing to leave its occurrence to others-
without it necessarily being the case, however, that her choice itself constitutes a
defense to rape. In contrast, a woman "legally" consents to sexual intercourse
when she does or experiences anything-including but not limited to her actually
choosing of sexual intercourse for herself-under such conditions as the
jurisdiction at hand deems sufficient for her conduct or experience to constitute a
defense to rape.
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To illustrate the difference between factual and legal consent, consider the
contrasting ways in which jurisdictions talk about the offense of statutory rape.
Some jurisdictions say of underage girls that "their consent is no defense." Other
jurisdictions say of them that being underage, they are "too young to consent."
The legal effect of both statements is identical, but the two usages of "consent" are
mutually exclusive. When a jurisdiction says that an underage girl's "consent" is
"no defense" to statutory rape, the jurisdiction is using "consent" factually: the
jurisdiction is referring to the girl's having actually chosen sexual intercourse for
herself, without connoting, however, that the girl's choice itself constitutes a
defense to statutory rape. (Indeed, if the jurisdiction were using "consent" to refer
to an actual choice of sexual intercourse that itself constituted a defense to
statutory rape, the jurisdiction would be contradicting itself in stating that the girl's
consent is "no defense" to statutory rape.) In contrast, when a jurisdiction says that
underage girls are "too young to consent," the jurisdiction does not claim that
underage girls are too young to desire sexual intercourse, or too young to choose it
as that which they prefer under the circumstances, or even too young to be
sufficiently indifferent as to be willing to leave its occurrence to others. Rather,
the jurisdiction means that regardless of how they may go about choosing sexual
intercourse for themselves, underage girls lack the competence that the
jurisdictions deem necessary for their choices to constitute a defense to statutory
rape.
B. "Attitudinal" Consent versus "Expressive" Consent
In addition to the foregoing contrast between factual and legal consent, the
generic concept of consent also ranges over a second pair of contrasting
conceptions of consent. The second pair is based on contrasting ways in which a
woman can actually choose sexual intercourse for herself. The contrast is between
a woman's subjectively choosing sexual intercourse and her objectively doing so.
Thus, when commentators and lawmakers say that a woman has "consented" to
sexual intercourse, they sometimes mean to refer to something the woman
subjectively experienced on a first-person basis. They are referring to the mental
or emotional attitude on the woman's part of having actually chosen sexual
intercourse for herself. The Canadian rape statute is an example. In making it an
offense for a person to have sexual intercourse with another without the latter's
"consent," the Canadian Parliament defines "consent" as a choice the latter person
subjectively experiences-as opposed to a choice she objectively manifests.3
At other times, however, when commentators and lawmakers refer to a
woman's "consent" to sexual intercourse, they are referring not to something she
feels, but to something she does. They are referring not to a subjective experience
of choice, but to an objective expression of choice. Thus, in making it an offense
3 Regina v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (construing Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §
265(1)(a) (1992) (Can.)).
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for an actor to have sexual intercourse with another person without the latter's
"consent," the Minnesota legislature defines "consent" as consisting of "words or
overt actions by a person indicating... agreement to perform a particular sexual
act.",
4
C. "Actual" Consent versus "Imputed" Consent
Finally, the generic concept of consent ranges over still a third pair of
contrasting conceptions of consent. The third pair consists of the contrast between
instances of the kinds of actual consent, on the one hand, and legalfictions of such
actual consent, on the other. Thus, when commentators and lawmakers say that a
woman has "consented" to sexual intercourse, they sometimes mean to refer to one
or more of the kind of actual choices of sexual intercourse that we have been
discussing thus far. That is, they mean that the woman actually chose sexual
intercourse for herself, regardless of whether she did so attitudinally or
expressively (or both), and regardless of whether she did so factually (and, hence,
in a way that does not itself constitute a defense to rape) or legally (and, hence,
under such conditions of competence, knowledge, and freedom that the jurisdiction
at hand deems sufficient to justify leaving the choice to her).
At other times, however, when commentators and lawmakers say that a
woman has "consented" to sexual intercourse, they mean quite the opposite. They
mean that although the woman did not actually choose sexual intercourse for
herself, the law will treat her as if she did and, moreover, as if she did so under
such conditions of competence, knowledge, and freedom as to entitle her partner to
a defense to rape. That is, they mean that the law imputes such an actual choice to
her, despite her having neither experienced nor manifested it. A good example is
the so-called "marital rape exemption," which is still in effect in some
jurisdictions, according to which a woman by virtue of marrying is deemed to
consent to future sexual relations to which her husband may subject her. Another
example is the rule in some jurisdictions to the effect that a woman who actually
chooses to commence to have sexual intercourse and who does so under
appropriate conditions of competence, knowledge, and freedom is deemed to
continue to consent throughout its duration, regardless of the fact that she
emphatically changes her mind in the very midst of it.
D. Relationships between Contrasting Conceptions of Consent
Each of these six conceptions of consent has its own distinct reference.
However, events can arise to which the contrasting conceptions of a pair both
apply. Thus, suppose that a woman wholeheartedly and voluntarily engages in
sexual intercourse with her husband within a jurisdiction that adheres to the marital
4 MINN. STAT. § 609.341(4) (2000).
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rape exemption. The jurisdiction could simultaneously say that she "actually"
consented by choosing sexual intercourse for herself, and that she "imputedly"
consented by virtue of marrying her husband.
Events can arise in which contrasting conceptions of "attitudinal" and
"expressive" consent also apply. But such events must arise in an inter-
jurisdictional context because no single jurisdiction can simultaneously define
consent as an attitude as opposed to an expression and as an expression as opposed
to an attitude. Suppose, therefore, that an inter-jurisdictional case arises between
Canada, which defines consent as a subjective attitude, and Minnesota, which
defines consent as an objective expression. Suppose further that the case involves
a woman who, in mind as well as word and deed, wholeheartedly and voluntarily
chooses to engage in sexual intercourse with her boyfriend. Both jurisdictions
would say that she "consented" for purposes of the law of rape, though they would
mean different things by it. Canada would mean that she subjectively consented in
her mind, while Minnesota would mean that she objectively consented in word and
deed.
The same is true of the contrasting conceptions of "factual" and "legal"
consent. To illustrate, consider the contrasting ways in which Canadian and
English statutes defined consent in the 1970s. Both statutes made it an offense for
a person to have sexual intercourse with a woman without the latter's "consent";
both statutes defined a woman's consent as an actual rather than imputed choice of
sexual intercourse on her part; and both statutes defined the choice as attitudinal
rather than expressive. 5 But the statutes differed in one respect-the Canadian
statute used "consent" factually, while the English statute used "consent" legally:
Canadian Criminal Code Section 1436
A male person commits rape when he has sexual intercourse with a
female person who is not his wife,
a. without her consent, or
b. with her consent if the consent
i. is extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm,
ii. is obtained by impersonating her husband, or
iii. is obtained by false and fraudulent representations
as to the nature and quality of the act.
5 See Regina v. Abraham, [1977] 30 C.C.C. (2d) 332 (quoting Rex v. Donovan, [1934] 2
K.B. 498 (Eng. C.A.)); Regina v. R, [1992] 1 A.C. 599 (Eng. C.A.), [1991] 4 All E.R. 481, [1991] 3
W.L.R. 767; Regina v. Olugboja, [1982] 1 Q.B. 320 (Eng. C.A.).
6 Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 143 (1970) (Can.) (repealed 1980-81).
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English Sexual Offences Act 7
[A] man commits rape if he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a
woman who at the time of the intercourse does not consent to it ....
Now suppose that an inter-jurisdictional instance arose in which a woman
subjectively chose to engage in sexual intercourse under conditions that both
Canada and England regarded as sufficient to justify leaving the choice to her and,
hence, to entitle her partner to a defense to rape. How would the two jurisdictions
talk about a joint decision to exonerate the woman's partner of any charge of rape?
England would say, the woman "consented"-and that would be all England
would have to say, because England uses "consent" to refer to actual choices that
occur under such conditions of competence, knowledge, and freedom as suffice, in
England's judgment, to themselves constitute defenses to rape. In contrast, Canada
would also say, the woman "consented." But that would not be all Canada would
have to say, because Canada uses "consent" more narrowly than England. Canada
uses consent in a factual sense to refer to actual choices that, though necessary to
constitute defenses to rape, are not sufficient. "Consent" does not suffice by itself
in Canada to constitute a defense, because given the way Canada uses "consent," a
woman may "consent" and yet have been induced to do so by the kinds of threats
or frauds that preclude her consent from constituting a defense. Accordingly, to
account for its decision, Canada would have to say something that would be
redundant in England-such as, for example, that the woman "validly" or
"lawfully" or "voluntarily" consented.
E. Cross-Cutting Relationships Among Pairs of Conceptions
We have thus far analyzed the six conceptions of consent by examining
events to which contrasting conceptions of a pair can both apply. We will now
examine the extent to which pairs of conceptions (or members of them) cross-cut
one another.
The most complete cross-cutting among pairs occurs with respect to the
relationship between actual consent (from the actual/imputed pair) and the pair
consisting of attitudinal and expressive consent. Every instance of actual consent
is an instance of a subjective and/or objective choosing of sexual intercourse; and,
hence, every instance of actual consent is also an instance of attitudinal consent,
expressive consent, or both. By the same token, every instance of attitudinal or
expressive consent is an instance of actual consent.
The cross-cutting relationship between imputed consent (from the
actual/imputed pair) and legal consent (from the factual/legal pair) is less
complete. Every instance of imputed consent is also an instance of legal consent
7 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 1976, 24 & 25 Eliz. II, c. 82, § 1(1) (Eng.).
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because imputed consent is a legal fiction, the purpose of which is to treat certain
conduct or experiences on a woman's part as if they were identical to the kinds of
instances of actual consent on her part that constitute defenses to rape. However,
the converse is not the case. Not all instances of legal consent are also instances of
imputed consent. On the contrary, as we shall see in a moment, most instances of
legal consent consist of a subset for we have not yet coined a term: they consist of
that subset of legal consent of which imputed consent is a legal fiction of
The most complex cross-cutting relationships are between the pairs that
consists of factual and legal consent, on the one hand, and actual consent, on the
other. All instances of factual consent, whether they are attitudinal or expressive
in nature, are also instances of actual consent because they all consist of instances
in which people subjectively or objectively choose sexual intercourse for
themselves. However, instances of legal consent are only sometimes instances of
actual consent. Legal consent consists of two subsets: imputed consent and what I
call "prescriptive consent." "Prescriptive consent," whether it is attitudinal or
expressive in nature, is that of which imputed consent is a fiction-namely,
instances of actual consent, whether attitudinal or expressive, that occur under such
conditions of competence, knowledge, and freedom as suffice for the choices to
themselves constitute defenses to rape.
As illustrations of prescriptive consent, recall the English and Minnesota rape
statutes. Both statutes make it an offense to have sexual intercourse with a person
without the latter's "consent." Both use "consent" in a legal rather than a factual
sense, because in contrast to Canada, the English and Minnesota statutes both
regard "consent" as something that, if obtained, suffices in itself to constitute a
defense to rape. Yet because neither statute imputes consent to women who have
sexual intercourse, both define "consent" prescriptively. Thus, England defines a
woman's consent as consisting of her subjectively choosing sexual intercourse
under conditions of competence, knowledge, and freedom sufficient in England's
judgment to justify leaving the choice to her. Minnesota defines a woman's
consent as consisting of her expressing that she is choosing sexual intercourse
under conditions sufficient in Minnesota's judgment to justify leaving the
expressed choice to her.
III. CONFUSING THE NORMATIVE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF ATTITUDINAL WITH
THOSE OF EXPRESSIVE CONSENT
Consent is one of a handful of concepts (along with freedom, equality,
democracy, etc.) by which we organize our normative thinking. These concepts
work because they are simultaneously capable of being both broadly generic and
highly specific. Consent is broadly generic because it applies wherever any person
in any way acquiesces to the project of another; yet consent is also specific because
it also takes the form of normatively contrasting conceptions. Unfortunately,
because we perceive this conceptual structure only darkly, we conflate one
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contrasting conception of consent with another, confusing ourselves and others in
our normative thinking about rape cases.
A good example, I think, is the notorious "condom" decision a few years ago
by a grand jury in Austin, Texas, to dismiss a rape charge against an armed burglar
who broke into a woman's apartment and subjected her to sexual intercourse at
knifepoint. The grand jury reasoned that by virtue of agreeing to submit to the
man if he were willing to put on a condom, the woman "consented" to the sex.
Women's groups, being understandably outraged, condemned the grand jury for
being morally perverse. Now it is possible that the grand jury was, indeed, a
morally perverse body. But it seems unlikely. Austin, with its woman city
manager and woman police chief, was a liberal city with one of the most
sophisticated sexual assault programs in the country. And the district attorney later
said that he regarded the grand jury as "actually ... a pretty good group.",8 It is
more likely that, rather than being morally perverse, the grand jury was simply
confused-confused by the kind of "consent" it was being asked to examine. In
asking the grand jury to determine whether the woman consented, the prosecutor
was using "consent" in the same legal sense in which the aforementioned English
rape statute uses "consent"-namely, to ask the grand jury to determine whether
the woman chose sexual intercourse under conditions that, in the eyes of the state,
justified leaving the decision to her. In contrast, the grand jury may have
understood the prosecutor to be using "consent" in the same factual sense in which
the aforementioned Canadian statute uses "consent"-namely, to ask whether the
woman chose sexual intercourse as that which she preferred for herself under the
circumstances in which she believed herself to be, even if her choice was the
product of "threats or fear of bodily harm." 9 Indeed, if the latter had been what the
prosecutor had asked, the grand jury would have been right to say the woman
"consented," because the woman most certainly did consent in that respect, both in
mind as well as word.
I will focus here on another kind of normative confusion, namely, the
difficulty that arises when commentators and lawmakers either overlook or
misunderstand the normative significance of defining consent for purposes of the
law of rape as attitude as opposed to an expression. We have seen that, as among
jurisdictions in which a woman's actual consent is a defense to rape, some
jurisdictions define such actual consent as an attitude on her part (e.g., Canada,
England), while other jurisdictions define it as an expression (e.g., Minnesota).
With respect to most jurisdictions, however, it is impossible to say whether they
choose to define actual consent in attitudinal as opposed to expressive terms (or
vice versa) because when one looks, one finds only silence-silence that implies
8 Jury Indicts Man in Rape Case He Says Condom Implied Consent, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Oct. 28, 1992, at 3A; Ross E. Milroy, Furor Over a Decision Not to Indict in a Rape Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992, at 30; No bill in Rape Case Prompts Outrage; Suspect Wore a Condom at
Woman's Request, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 10, 1992, at 30A.
9 Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 143(b)(i) (1970) (Can.) (repealed 1980-81).
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that the jurisdictions are either oblivious to the normative differences between
attitudinal and expressive consent or dismissive of them.
With respect to commentators, the problem is the opposite. Rather than
overlooking the distinction between attitudinal and expressive consent,
commentators focus on it intently. Some commentators take the position that from
a normative standpoint, prescriptive consent is most emphatically a subjective
choice, and not an objective expression of choice, and, hence, the law of rape
ought to treat it as such.' 0 In contrast, other commentators argue that from a
normative standpoint, consent is most emphatically a speech act and not a
subjective state of mind, and the law of rape ought to treat it as such." I believe
that this dispute is misconceived, because it rests upon a fallacious assumption. It
rests on the fallacy that there is a single, normatively correct answer to the
question, "What is the criminal defense of consent to sexual intercourse-an
attitude or an act?" For in reality, there are at least two normatively correct
answers to the question, depending upon what jurisdictions regard as the purposes
of punishment with respect to rape. Within jurisdictions that regard "rape" as a
crime analogous to attempted murder, the punishment for which ought solely to be
a function of an actor's blameworthiness, consent ought to be defined as an
objective expression on a woman's part. In contrast, within jurisdictions that
regard "rape" as a crime analogous to murder, the punishment for which ought not
solely to be a function of an actor's blameworthiness but ought also to reflect
resulting harm, consent ought to be defined as a subjective attitude on a woman's
part.
To illustrate the relationship between a jurisdiction's definition of "consent"
and its purposes in punishing offenders, suppose that jurisdiction makes it an
1o See Hurd, supra note 2, at 126 ("[O]ne must conclude that consent is equivalent not to
desire as such, but to the execution of a desire, namely, to choice."); accord Larry Alexander, The
Moral Magic of Consent (II), in 2 LEGAL THEORY 165, 165-66 (1996) ("I agree [with Hurd] that
consent ... must be the exercise of will and, thus, a subjective mental state.").
11 See, e.g., Nathan Brett, Commentary, in LEGAL THEORY MEETS LEGAL PRACTICE, 253, 257
(Anne Bayefsky ed., 1998) (embracing a "performative account of consent"); Heidi Malm, The
Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law of Rape, in 2 LEGAL THEORY 147, 147
(1996) ("I think there are strong pragmatic reasons for thinking that 'consent' is best defined as the
signification of a particular mental state, rather than as the mental state itself."); Joan McGregor,
Force, Consent, and the Reasonable Woman, in IN HARMS WAY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOEL
FEINBERG 231, 242 (Jules Coleman & Allen Buchanan eds., 1994) ("Consent is performative, it is
something that an agent does."); Emily Sherwin, Infelicitous Sex, in 2 LEGAL THEORY 209, 209-10
(1996) ("Consent is a social act ... an act designed for the expression of a subjective choice.");
Lucinda Vandervort, Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea, 2 CAN. J. WOMEN
& L. 233, 267 (1987-88) ("The social act of consent consists of communication to another person, by
means of verbal and non-verbal [behavior], of permission to perform one or more acts which that
person would otherwise have a legal or non-legal obligation not to perform. Consenting, like
promising, is thus performative."); Alan Wertheimer, What is Consent? And Is It Important?, 3 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REv. 557, 557 (2000) ("I shall argue [that] ... consent is best understood as a performative
or [as] action, not as a subjective phenomenon."); see also ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL
RELATIONS 144-62 (2003).
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offense for a person "to have sexual intercourse with a woman either without her
consent or with her consent if she consents in fear of bodily harm." Suppose
further that courts within the jurisdiction have not yet decided whether the phrase
"consenting in fear of bodily harm" refers to an objective act of acquiescing in fear
of bodily harm or a subjective attitude of acquiescing in fear of bodily harm.
Suppose, finally, that the two following cases arise, the first of which involves a
woman who acquiesces in word but not in mind, the second of which involves a
woman who consents in mind but not in word.
Terrorized Susan (In Word but not in Mind) 12
Susan lives with an abusive boyfriend who regularly beats Susan
with violence that has been escalating. On the day in question, the
boyfriend begins to beat Susan about the face, but then uncustomarily
stops and, while holding her by the hair, tells her she has a "choice."
"You can take the beating you deserve. Or you can avoid it by going
outside, accosting a passerby, and doing your best to get him in the house
and giving him oral sex. And, remember, I'll be watching, and if I don't
think you're trying hard enough, I'll give you a beating you'll never
forget." Susan, after futile begging, does as instructed: masking her fear,
Susan cajoles a passerby into entering her house; and while Susan is
being watched by her boyfriend from behind a door, she performs fellatio
on the passerby. The boyfriend and passerby are thereafter both charged
with rape, to which the passerby says in his defense, "I realize now that
Susan submitted out of fear of bodily harm, and I feel terrible about it.
But I had no idea at the time. I thought she was just coming on to me."
Undercover Mark (In Mind but not in Word) 13
Mark lives in a civil union with a former detective who knows how
to inflict torture without leaving any marks. Mark's partner tortures
Mark until Mark submits to a form of sexual intercourse that Mark finds
degrading; and, having forced Mark to submit, the former detective
announces that he intends to do the same thing the following night.
Mark immediately reports the assault to the police, but they tell him that
local juries tend not to convict in such cases unless there is evidence of
injuries or a videotape. Hearing the word "videotape," Mark offers to go
undercover by equipping the house with surveillance equipment. The
prosecutor is initially reluctant, but she eventually agrees when Mark
12 Cf People v. Burnham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1134 (1985). For an account of the Burnham
trial, see SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 30, 1986, at B-17.
13 Cf New York v. Bink, 444 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1981).
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assures her that he will call for help if he wants it. When evening comes,
the former detective orders Mark to submit. Mark cries and begs him not
to force him to submit. But when Mark sees his partner seize the
equipment he used the previous night to torture him, Mark tells his
partner that he'll do anything rather than suffer such pain again. Mark
considers calling the police but decides instead to go through with the
sex, while pretending the entire time to be terrified. Mark's partner is
charged with rape, to which he says in his defense, "Yes, I admit that I
thought at the time that Mark was submitting for fear of bodily harm, but
I now know that he was faking and only pretending to be in fear."
"Terrorized Susan" and "Undercover Mark" will each be decided differently,
depending upon whether the courts of the jurisdiction interpret the statutory term
"consent" to be a subjective attitude or an objective expression on a putative
victim's part. If the courts hold consent to be an attitude, Susan's abusive
boyfriend and the unwitting passerby will both be guilty of rape (unless the
passerby has a separate defense of lack of mens rea), because Susan did not freely
acquiesce in her mind. At the same time, Mark's partner will be guilty not of rape
but of attempted rape, because although he thought Mark was acquiescing out of
fear of bodily harm, Mark was not in fear at all. In contrast, if consent is held to be
an expression, Susan's boyfriend and Mark's partner will both be guilty of rape
because Susan communicated to the former and Mark communicated to the latter
that each was terrified of being beaten; at the same time, the passerby will not be
guilty of any offense of sexual assault because Susan successfully (albeit
disingenuously) communicated to the passerby that she was freely acquiescing in
their sexual intercourse.
To assess the normative force of the two interpretations, let us consider the
normative functions they respectively perform. Defining consent as an expression
serves two appropriate normative functions in criminal law-one with respect to
accused actors, the other with respect to their putative victims. Defining consent
as an expression has the virtue of making an actor's criminal responsibility a
function of what he is capable of inferring his sexual partner's desires to be under
the circumstances. An actor's criminal responsibility ought to be a function of
what he is capable of inferring regarding the interests of others, because to blame a
person is to attribute certain motivations to him regarding the interests of others
(i.e., hatred, callousness, indifference or inadvertence). To punish a person for
what he could not have known regarding his victim's desires (e.g., the passerby in
Susan's case) is to attribute motivations of hatred or callousness, disregard, or
carelessness to him that he did not possess. Defining consent as an expression also
has the virtue of making an actor's criminal responsibility a function of his victim
suffering a certain harm-namely, the dignitary harm that an actor inflicts upon a
sexual partner by subjecting her to sexual intercourse that he infers or ought to
infer she does not desire. An actor like the passerby in Susan's case does not
inflict that dignitary harm if his sexual partner's expressions reasonably lead him
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to believe that he is acting in accord with her wishes. He inflicts this dignitary
harm upon her only if he subjects her to sexual intercourse in the absence of
expressions that reasonably lead him to believe that he is acting in accord with her
desires.
Based on the foregoing analysis of consent-as-expression, the practice of
defining consent as an attitude seems normatively deficient because it fails to base
an actor's blameworthiness upon what he is capable of inferring his partner's
interests to be and upon whether he inflicts dignitary harm on her. And, indeed,
standing alone, the practice of defining consent as an attitude is deficient because
it not only acquits Mark's partner (who, while acting with a guilty mind, inflicted a
dignitary harm upon Mark) but it convicts Susan's passerby. In reality, however,
definitions of attitudinal consent do not stand alone, at least not in cases involving
sexual intercourse by means of force. Rather, they are invariably accompanied by
two other rules that negate the normative deficiencies described above: first, they
are buttressed by prohibitions of attempted rape of which Mark's partner would be
guilty; and second, they are accompanied by rules requiring mens rea under which
the passerby would be acquitted. The combination causes consent-as-attitude to
reproduce much the same effect as consent-as-expression.
Why, then, would a jurisdiction choose to define consent as an attitude? The
answer is that, although defining consent as an attitude produces much the same
effect as defining it as an expression, it does not produce the identical effect. The
two approaches to consent differ in one significant respect: by defining consent as
an attitude, a jurisdiction can grade sexual offenses as between "rape" and
"attempted rape," depending upon whether or not victims suffer a further harm that
we have not yet discussed-namely, primary harm that all rape statutes seek to
prevent, regardless of their form. To identify that primary harm, consider the
dignitary and primary harms underlying the offenses of "destruction of property"
and "murder," respectively. An actor who maliciously destroys another's property
inflicts a dignitary harm upon him, i.e., the dignitary harm of manifesting contempt
for his victim's legitimate interest in possessing and enjoying his property. By the
same token, an actor who murders inflicts a dignitary harm on his victim, i.e., the
dignitary harm of manifesting contempt for another's life. However, the dignitary
harm of murder is considerably greater than the dignitary harm of destruction of
property because the primary harm that murder statutes seek to prevent, i.e., loss of
life, is so much greater than the primary harm that destruction-of-property statutes
seek to prevent, i.e., preserving property. The two dignitary harms differ in
magnitude because, as dignitary harms, they are derivative of primary harms that
themselves differ in magnitude.
Mark's partner and Susan's boyfriend both inflict the same dignitary harm on
their victims, i.e., the dignitary harm of manifesting disregard for their victims'
sexual autonomy. The dignitary harm Mark's partner and Susan's boyfriend inflict
is commonly regarded to be less than the dignitary harm of murder and, yet,
greater than the dignitary harm of malicious destruction of property; because the
primary harm that rape statutes seek to prevent is commonly regarded as being a
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harm that is less than loss of life and, yet, greater than loss of property. What,
then, is the primary harm that rape statutes seek to prevent? It is harm that Susan's
boyfriend and Mark's partner both thought they were inflicting but only Susan's
boyfriend succeeded in inflicting. It is the harm a woman suffers when she is
subjected to sexual intercourse without her having subjectively chosen it for
herself under the conditions of competence, knowledge, and freedom of choice to
which the jurisdiction at hand believes her to be entitled. Because the latter harm
is a function of a victim's not having subjectively chosen sexual intercourse in
certain ways, the decision to define consent as a subjective attitude is a decision to
base the crime of rape on the occurrence of that harm.
In sum, and contrary to what commentators claim, the choice between
defining consent as an attitude and defining it as an expression is not a choice
between defining it correctly and defining it wrongly. It is a policy choice that is
appropriate for jurisdictions to make in their discretion. It is the choice between a
policy of grading the offense of rape on the basis of the occurrence of the primary
harm that all rape statutes seek to prevent, or the policy of defining the offense
solely in terms of dignitary harms. The criminal law is rife with statutes based
upon such policies. "Murder" is an offense that is predicated on the occurrence of
the primary harm that all homicide statutes seek to prevent, i.e, loss of life. Thus,
as among two actors who do everything they can to wrongfully kill, one of whom
succeeds and the other of whom fails, only the actor who succeeds is guilty of
murder, the other one being at most guilty of attempted murder. In contrast,
"larceny" is an offense that is defined solely in terms of the dignitary harm that an
actor inflicts by manifesting willingness to "take" and permanently "carry away"
the property of another. Thus, as between two actors who both do everything they
can to permanently deprive another of his property, one of whom succeeds and the
other of whom fails, the offense of larceny is the same, regardless of the fact that
only one succeeds in inflicting the primary harm that larceny statutes seek to
prevent. The difference between defining consent as an attitude and defining it as
an expression is the difference between modeling the offense of rape on murder or
modeling it on larceny.
To be sure, commentators disagree sharply about the justice of basing
criminal punishment on resulting harm. Some, including Andrew Ashworth,
14
regard it as unjust, while others, including Antony Duff,15 regard it as just.
Ashworth and Duff, whose positions highlight the controversy, argue essentially as
follows:
14 See Andrew Ashworth, Taking the Consequences, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL
LAW, 107 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993); see also Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal
Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679 (1993).
15 See ANTONY DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 334-47 (1996); see also MICHAEL S. MOORE,
PLACING BLAME 193-247 (1997).
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Andrew Ashworth
Premise 1: It is presumptively unjust for a state to cause an actor to
suffer more than or less than what he morally deserves by virtue of his
wrongdoing.
Premise 2: The maximum state-imposed suffering an actor morally
deserves by virtue of his wrongdoing is exclusively a function of
elements that constitute the offenses of attempt and risk-taking, namely,
a criminal intent to engage in wrongful conduct plus a demonstrated
willingness to act on that intent.
Premise 3: When a state augments an actor's suffering because of
the harm his wrongdoing causes, the state either punishes him in excess
of what he deserves by virtue of his criminal intent and willingness to act
on it, or punishes those guilty of attempt and risk-taking less than they
deserve, or both.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is presumptively unjust for a state to
augment an actor's suffering because of the harm his wrongdoing causes.
Antony Duff
Premise 1: It is not unjust for a state to cause an actor to suffer what
he morally deserves because of his wrongdoing.
Premise 2: The consequences of an actor's wrongdoing-that is,
whether it luckily harms no one or unluckily causes harm-has moral
import because it bears upon how people, including the state and
wrongdoer himself, ought to respond to the wrongdoing and, specifically,
whether they ought to feel genuine relief, on the one hand, or profound
grief for the victim and full righteous anger toward the wrongdoer, on the
other.
Premise 3: Whether an actor harms no one or causes harm also
matters to the amount of suffering he morally deserves because of his
wrongdoing.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is not unjust for the state to invoke the
harm a wrongdoer causes in order to augment his suffering beyond what
he deserves by virtue of his criminal intent and demonstrated willingness
to act on it.
Ashworth and Duff both proceed from strong premises. Thus, Ashworth is
correct, I believe, that the maximum suffering an actor morally deserves for his
wrongdoing is exclusively a function of the elements that constitute criminal
attempts and criminal risk-taking, namely, criminal intent and willingness to act on
it. And, hence, Ashworth is also correct that by augmenting the punishment of
harm-based offenses, the state either punishes harm-based offenses more than they
deserve or punishes attempts and risk-taking offenses less than they deserve. At
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the same time, however, I believe Duff is also correct that the occurrence of harm
matters morally to how the state, and wrongdoers themselves, ought to regard and
respond to wrongdoing and its victims.
Unfortunately, Ashworth and Duff both make further moves that undermine
their respective conclusions. Duff assumes in Premise 3 that because resulting
harm has moral bearing upon how the state ought to regard and respond to
wrongdoers and their victims, resulting harm also has moral bearing upon how
much state-imposed suffering wrongdoers deserve. Resulting harm does have
moral bearing, but not upon the levels of punishment wrongdoers deserve.
(Indeed, if harm had moral bearing on desert, then every jurisdiction that follows
the Model Penal Code in punishing certain inchoate crimes at the same level as
harm-based crimes would be inconsistent with desert). Harm has moral bearing
because it rightly evokes feelings of grief, loss, and compassion for victims of
wrongdoing, just as it rightly evokes anger toward wrongdoers. For that reason,
while harm does not alter the state-imposed suffering wrongdoers deserve by
virtue of their criminal intent and willingness to act on it, it can rightly affect the
amount of suffering the state is motivated to impose on offenders within the range
of what they deserve, because it can rightly motivate the state to impose the full
measure of suffering wrongdoers deserve, rather than to grant them undeserved
leniency. By the same token, when harm fails to occur, the state rightly feels less
grief, less loss, less engagement and less righteous anger than if harm occurred.
For that reason, as Plato observed long ago, the absence of harm can rightly leave
the state feeling less motivated to give wrongdoers the full measure of suffering
they deserve and more inclined to register its relief by granting them a measure of
supererogatory leniency. 16
Ashworth, in turn, is too quick to assume in Premise 1 that it is presumptively
unjust for the state to give those who are guilty of criminal attempt and criminal
risk-taking less punishment than they deserve. Whether it is presumptively unjust
depends upon whether it is appropriate for a state to withhold the full punishment a
wrongdoer deserves when, because his wrongdoing luckily turns out to be
harmless, the state is rightly less engaged and, hence, politically disposed to "let it
go." I should think that that is a policy regarding criminal responsibility for each
state to decide for itself. A jurisdiction may decide to follow the Model Penal
Code's policy on attempts and attach no weight to resulting harm. Or,
alternatively, it may choose to do what Plato felt a state is obliged to do, namely, to
acknowledge the fact that it feels less grief, less loss, less righteous anger and less
political engagement when harm fails to occur and, hence, less political desire to
impose the full measure of suffering that wrongdoers may personally deserve. A
state that adopts the former policy will be inclined to define consent as an
expression. A state that adopts the latter policy will be inclined to define consent
as an attitude.
16 PLATO, Laws 9.876-9.877, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 1225, 1434-36 (Edith
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Lane Cooper et al. trans., 1963).
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IV. CONFUSING THE FEATURES OF FACTUAL CONSENT WITH THE FEATURES OF
PRESCRIPTIVE CONSENT
Factual consent and prescriptive consent share a feature in common: they both
consist, in whole or in part, of something that is empirical in nature, namely,
instances of actual consent. A person actually consents to sexual intercourse
(whether in mind, word, or deed) when she actually chooses sexual intercourse
(whether in mind, word or deed) as that which she unconditionally desires for
herself, as that which she prefers for herself under the circumstances in which she
believes herself to be, or as that about which she is sufficiently indifferent to it as
to be willing to leave its occurrence to others. Actual consent is empirical in
nature because it is a question of fact, not a question of policy, whether a person
has actually made such a choice for herself.
The difference between factual consent and prescriptive consent is that while
factual consent is constituted by instances of actual consent, prescriptive consent
merely includes instances of actual consent. To prescriptively consent to sexual
intercourse, a woman must actually consent to it, to be sure. But she must also do
something else that is normative in nature: she must actually consent to it under
such conditions of competence, knowledge, and freedom that the jurisdiction at
hand deems normatively sufficient to justify leaving the matter to her.
Courts and commentators commonly approach contested issues of
prescriptive consent as if they consisted solely of empirical issues characteristic of
factual consent. I will address two such confusions in this section: (A) confusions
regarding the relationship of prescriptive consent to "resistance"; and (B)
confusions regarding the relationship between prescriptive consent and "force."
A. Prescriptive Consent and "Resistance"
Courts and commentators like to tell a certain story about the role of
resistance in rape cases. The story goes something like this:
A Commonplace Tale about Resistance
In the old days, the law required, as a condition for convicting men
of rape, that women "resist to the utmost," even to the point of death or
grievous bodily injury. Resistance requirements are based upon men's
fears that women will consent to sexual intercourse or, at least, appear to
consent, and yet later maintain that they did not; and, therefore,
resistance requirements are designed to provide objective evidence to
actors and courts that who claim not to have consented were telling the
truth. The rape reform movement of the 1970s, in the name of taking
women at their word, set out to eradicate resistance requirements, and it
largely succeeded. Although some jurisdictions still retain mild forms of
resistance requirements, the utmost resistance rule has been abolished
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everywhere, and jurisdictions are more and more abolishing resistance
requirements altogether.17
The Commonplace Tale is widespread, and yet every part of it is false. No
Anglo-American jurisdiction has ever required, as a condition for a man's being
guilty of rape, that a woman resist to the point of death or grievous bodily injury.
Resistance requirements are not evidentiary rules designed to provide evidence to
actors and courts that women who claim not to have consented are telling the truth.
The utmost-resistance requirement has not been abolished, nor could it sensibly be
abolished. No jurisdiction has truly eliminated resistance requirements, nor could
any jurisdiction do so.
The fallacies of the Commonplace Tale are not normative in origin-that is,
they are not the consequence of certain normative views as to what counts, or
ought to count, as rape. One can possess all the normative views of those who tell
the Tale without committing its fallacies. Rather, the fallacies are conceptual in
origin. They are the product of misunderstanding the relationship between actual
consent to sexual intercourse, on the one hand, and the various kinds of freedom
that jurisdictions may require to transform such actual consent into prescriptive
consent to sexual intercourse, on the other.
Requirements and prohibitions of resistance are both inherent in the freedoms
that jurisdictions prescribe to transform actual consent into prescriptive consent.
There are two mutually exclusive kinds of wrongful force by which actors subject
women to sexual intercourse against their will: (1) overwhelming physical
strength; and (2) threats. An actor achieves sexual intercourse by means of
"overwhelming physical strength" when, like a collegiate wrestler, he uses superior
muscle power and physical adroitness to subdue his counterpart, despite her doing
everything she physically can to prevent it-the difference, of course, being that
collegiate wrestlers welcome the risk of being pinned to the mat despite their doing
17 See, e.g., Joan McGregor, Why When She Says No She Doesn't Mean Maybe and Doesn't
Mean Yes, in 2 LEGAL THEORY 175 (1996):
Historically, rape was defined as "carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and
against her will".... The result was that to prove "forcibly" and "against her will," the
courts . . . required victim resistance, expressed first as "utmost resistance." This
requirement reflected the view that it was better for a woman to die than to be
"dishonored."
Id. at 176-77. Robin West, A Comment on Consent, Sex, and Rape, in 2 LEGAL THEORY 233, 277
(1996) ("To be a rape victim, one had to be so vigilant about protecting one's honor that one would
truly fight to the death to protect it."); see also People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 117-20 (Cal. 1986);
In the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992); Michele Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape
Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953-68; Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1101, 1131 (1986);
Robert Rickett, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 680, 689 (1966);
Susan Schwartz, An Argument for the Elimination of the Resistance Requirement for the Definition of
Rape, 6 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 567, 569-70 (1983); Lucy Reed Harris, Comment, Towards a Consent
Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. Cii. L. REV. 613, 626 (1976); Pamela Lakes Wood, Note, The
Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. J. CRIM. L. 335, 346 (1973).
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everything they can within the rules to prevent it, while women typically do not
welcome being subdued and sexually penetrated despite their doing everything
they physically can to prevent it. It is characteristic of overwhelming physical
strength that when actors use it to achieve sexual intercourse, they do so without
enlisting acts of will or cooperation on the part of their sexual partners. In
contrast, when an actor achieves sexual intercourse by means of threats, he does so
precisely by actively enlisting the will or cooperation of his victim. Rather than
subduing her by means of overwhelming physical strength, he induces her to
submit by confronting her with an alternative that is sufficiently grim in her eyes as
to induce her to submit to sexual intercourse rather than face it.
Every jurisdiction makes it an offense to elicit sexual intercourse by means of
overwhelming physical strength, at least in cases in which the woman does not
welcome the risk of being forcibly subdued and penetrated. Every jurisdiction also
makes it an offense to elicit sexual intercourse by means of certain threats, though
jurisdictions differ as to the kinds of threats they prohibit as means for eliciting
sexual intercourse. Thus, all jurisdictions prohibit threats of death, grievous bodily
injury, or extreme pain; some jurisdictions go further and prohibit threats of any
bodily injury; some go even further and prohibit threats that would "prevent
resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution."' 8 Yet no jurisdiction goes so far as
to make it a crime to induce a woman to submit to sexual intercourse by
threatening, say, to destroy a bauble of hers of trivial value or to stop inviting her
to social events.
Requirements that a woman resist an actor's pressure on her to submit to
sexual intercourse-and, indeed, that a woman resist to the utmost-are logically
corollaries of statutory regimes in which an actor is guilty of sexual intercourse by
means of force if and only if he induces a woman to submit by means of
overwhelming physical strength or wrongful threats. To illustrate, suppose that a
jurisdiction makes it an offense to elicit sexual intercourse by means of (i)
overwhelming physical strength, or (ii) threats of death, bodily harm, extreme pain,
or overwhelming physical strength. Suppose further that the following three cases
arise:
The Wrestler. A 280-pound wrestler, whom Megan used to date
and who Megan believes would never beat her or badly hurt her,
suddenly pins her to the ground and, while using his superior weight and
strength to hold her down, sexually penetrates her, despite her drawing
upon every ounce of her strength to push him off.
The Threatener. A next-door neighbor of Rachel drops by to
borrow sugar and, while there, suddenly grabs Rachel by the arm and,
holding his face close to hers, threatens to "beat the shit" out of her
18 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) (1985).
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unless she performs fellatio on him. Rachel pleads with him to let her
alone, but when he grabs a rolling pin as if to hit her, she reluctantly
submits, feeling she has no other alternative to being badly beaten or
killed.
The Manipulator. A young man is making out with his girlfriend,
Lisa, in her college dorm room when he starts to pull down her
underwear in order to have intercourse with her. Lisa pushes his hand
away several times, but she eventually desists and reluctantly lets him
have his way because she is afraid that if she persists, he may give her
slap across the face, curse her, and stomp out, just as he did the last time.
Megan, in her tussle with the wrestler, resisted to the utmost and became a
victim of what the statute defines as "rape." In actuality, however, the relationship
between Megan's resistance and her becoming a victim of rape under the statute is
stronger than that. Megan was a victim of what the statute defines as rape because
she resisted to the utmost: she was a victim of rape under the statute because her
assailant resorted to a kind of force, i.e., overwhelming physical strength, that is
defined as the muscle power and physical adroitness needed to overcome all a
woman is physically able to do to thwart sexual intercourse. In contrast, if Megan
(like Lisa) had refrained from doing all she could to thwart her partner-that is, if
Megan had not resisted to the utmost but had submitted because of fear of the
alternatives-Megan would not have been a victim of rape by means of
overwhelming physical strength because she would not have been someone of
whom it could be said, "She did everything she physically could to thwart him, but
he overwhelmed her with superior muscle power." She would at most have been a
victim of rape by means of wrongful threats.
Rachel, in dealing with her neighbor's wrongful threats, was also a victim of
what the statute defines as rape without having resisted. In actuality, however, the
relationship between Rachel's non-resistance and her being a victim of what the
statute defines as rape is stronger than that. In so far as the statute makes it a crime
to elicit sexual intercourse from a woman by threatening her with death or grievous
bodily injury, the statute does not require, and, logically, it cannot require, that
Rachel resist, because by resisting, she would bring upon herself the very thing the
statute says she does not have to suffer as a consequence of refusing to submit to
sexual intercourse-namely, death or grievous bodily injury. In contrast, if Rachel
(like Lisa) had not feared death or grievous bodily injury at her partner's hands-
that is, if Rachel had submitted to sexual intercourse because of a fear of
something else such as being given a slap across the face or cursed-she would
have not have been a victim of what the statute defines as rape. She would not
have been a victim of what the statute defines as rape because she had an option by
which she could have escaped both sexual intercourse and the alternatives of death,
grievous bodily injury, extreme pain and the application of overwhelming physical
strength from which the statute seeks protects her-namely, the option of taking
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the consequences of being given a slap and cursed. In that respect, the statute does
two things: (1) it negates one species of resistance requirement, i.e., the supposed
requirement that a woman resist at the cost of death, grievous bodily injury,
extreme pain, or the application of overwhelming physical strength; and (2) it
contains another species of resistance requirement, i.e., the requirement that before
a woman will be heard to allege rape, she must resort to options she believes she
possesses by which she can avoid both sexual intercourse and the alternative
consequences from which the statute seeks to protect her.
To be sure, one can rightly criticize a rape statute that fails to protect women
like Lisa who submit to sexual intercourse for fear of being given a slap. But it is
misleading to frame the criticism as a grievance about "resistance" requirements
themselves because it is not a grievance about resistance requirements in general.
It is a grievance about the particular way in which the statute defines wrongful
threats and, hence, a particular resistance requirement. It cannot be a grievance
about resistance requirements in general because resistance requirements are
corollaries of wrongful threats. To illustrate, suppose that the statute is amended to
make it an offense to elicit sexual intercourse by threats of death, grievous bodily
injury, the application of overwhelming physical strength or moderate pain,
including the pain of being slapped. Suppose, too, that the following event arises:
The Curser. Stella is making out with her boyfriend when he starts
to pull down her underwear in order to have intercourse with her. Stella
pushes his hand away several times, but she eventually desists and
reluctantly lets him have his way because, though she knows he would
never strike her, she is afraid that if she persists, he may curse her and
stomp out, just as he did the last time.
Stella is not a victim of rape under the statute, because although the statute
has eliminated one resistance requirement, it has retained another. The statute has
eliminated the rule that before a woman will be heard to allege rape, she must
resist and put up with being slapped if she believes that by doing so, she can
simultaneously avoid both sexual intercourse and the alternatives from which the
statute seeks to protect her. But the statute has retained the rule that before a
woman will be heard to allege rape, she must resist and put up with being cursed, if
she believes that by doing so she will be able to simultaneously avoid both sexual
intercourse and the alternatives from which the statute seeks to protect her.
Now it might be thought that a rule to the effect that "No means no" would
change this, but it would not. Analytically, "No means no" is just another rule,
albeit in prophylactic form, that makes it a crime to elicit sexual intercourse by
means of certain threats; and, hence, like all such rules, "No means no" does not
require some kinds of resistance on a woman's part and, yet, does require others.
"No means no" makes it a crime to elicit sexual intercourse from a woman either
while she is saying "no" or after she says "no," unless and until she changes her
mind. As such, "No means no" implicitly makes it a crime to elicit sexual
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intercourse from a woman by implicitly threatening her with having to do anything
beyond saying "no" to avoid it. It follows, therefore, that a woman who says "no"
and does not change her mind is not required to mount any further resistance as a
condition for convicting a man who thereafter has sexual intercourse with her. Yet
it also follows that a woman is not a victim of rape under the rule unless she at
least mounts the resistance of saying "no."
B. Prescriptive Consent and "Force"
Courts and commentators are also confused about the conceptual relationship
between prescriptive consent and force. To introduce the confusion, let us return
for a moment to the Commonplace Tale. I have discussed most of the fallacious
claims that constitute the Commonplace Tale, but I have not yet addressed the
claim that resistance rules are evidentiary rather than substantive in nature. The
latter is the claim that, rather than altering the substantive meaning of "consent,"
resistance rules are designed to maintain existing definitions of consent while
providing evidence to actors and courts that women who claim not to have
consented are telling the truth.
We I4ave seen that, contrary to the Commonplace Tale, resistance
requirements are, indeed, substantive in nature because they are substantive
correlatives of substantive definitions of overwhelming physical strength and
wrongful threats. Why, then, do courts and commentators maintain the opposite?
The answer, I think, is that they are conceptually confused about prescriptive
consent in cases in which a womanfeels coerced by the pressure of circumstances
to acquiesce to sexual intercourse. Courts and commentators mistakenly think that
whether a woman prescriptively consents to sexual intercourse under the pressure
of circumstances is a question of what she really wants under the circumstances.' 9
They then reason that women who resist sexual intercourse do not really want to
engage in it. Having thus concluded that women who resist sexual intercourse do
not prescriptively consent to it, they, therefore, conclude that when jurisdictions
require resistance, jurisdictions must be requiring resistance for evidentiary reasons
that are independent of women's non-consent.
The mistake that courts and commentators make is in thinking that, with
respect to women who feel coerced to acquiesce to sexual intercourse, prescriptive
consent is a function of what the women really want. It is a mistake because, when
a woman reluctantly acquiesces to sexual intercourse under the pressure of
circumstances, she typically wants two things: she really wants to engage in sexual
intercourse because she really prefers the sexual intercourse to the alternatives she
believes she would otherwise face if she refused (otherwise she would not be
19 See Joshua Dressier, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some
Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 409, 429 (1998) ("The bottom
line [in rape cases] ultimately is the same: did the female want the intimacy to occur at this time or
not?").
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acquiescing); and, yet at the same time, the woman really does not want to engage
in sexual intercourse because she would not be acquiescing were the pressure of
circumstances not what they are. The controlling issue in such cases, therefore, is
not a factual question as to whether the women really want to have sex when they
acquiesce under the pressure of circumstances-because they both do and do not-
but a normative question as to whether in choosing sexual intercourse for
themselves, they do so with the freedom the statute at hand regards as sufficient to
leave the decision to them. Once one answers the latter question, one also knows
what kinds of resistance they are and are not required to mount.
To illustrate, recall Stella who felt forced to go along with her boyfriend's
desire for sexual intercourse rather than be cursed. Did Stella really want to have
sexual intercourse with her boyfriend? She did and she did not. She did not want
to have sexual intercourse with her boyfriend when she was pushing his hands
away from her underwear, because at that moment, she preferred physical
resistance to sexual intercourse. Nor did she want it at the very moment of sexual
intercourse, because she would not have gone along with him then if she had not
been afraid of being cursed. Yet she also did want it at the very moment of sexual
intercourse, because at that moment she preferred sexual intercourse to the
alternative of being cursed. The legally-interesting question in Stella's case is not
whether she actually consented to sexual intercourse in the context of feeling
coerced-because, given that she decided to submit, she clearly did-but whether
she prescriptively consented. The answer to the latter question has nothing to do
with what Stella was thinking or what she expressed herself to be thinking. It has
to do with the kinds of freedom the jurisdiction at hand believes women ought to
possess for purposes of their sexual integrity.
Conceptual mistakes about prescriptive consent and force are not confined to
isolated discussions of resistance. They arise whenever authorities discuss the
most basic terms for defining rape. Authorities differ widely on how "rape" ought
to be defined. Thus, some commentators and states take the position that rape
ought to be defined in terms of "non-consent" rather than "force. ' '2° Others take
the contrary position that rape ought to be defined in terms of "force" rather than
not "non-consent., 21 Still other commentators take the position that rape ought to
20 For states that define rape in terms of non-consent rather than force, see KAN. STAT. ANN. §
21-3502 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502(1) (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (2001); Wis.
STAT. § 940.225 (2000). For commentators who argue that rape should be defined in terms of non-
consent rather than force, see STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 11, 32-33 (1998); Estrich, supra note 17, at 1095-96; Lynne
Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW & PHIL. 127, 158 (1992).
2 1 For states that define rape in terms of force rather than non-consent, see ARK. CODE ANN. §
5-14-103(a)(1)(A) (Michie 2003) ("compulsion"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3002(a)(1)-(2) (2001);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(3) (Michie 2004) ("force or violence"); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1(1) (2001);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c(1) (West 2001) ("physical force or coercion"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2907.02(a)(2) (Anderson 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111 (a)(3) (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-
22-1(2) (Michie 2001). For commentators who argue that rape should be defined in terms of force
rather than non-consent, see CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
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be defined in terms of "non-consent" or "force. 22 I believe that this debate is a
manifestation of conceptual confusion. Any criminal regulation of rape that is
presently stated in terms of "non-consent" can be stated interchangeably in terms
of "force," and vice versa, though stating it in terms of "non-consent" is
conceptually less circuitous. Rather than support the entirety of the foregoing
assertion, however, I will focus here on a selection of claims that are sometimes
made to the contrary.
Consider first the argument that defining rape in terms of "force" is
normatively deficient. Robin West states the argument in representative fashion,
using the example of a professor who pressures a student into sexual intercourse by
threatening the student with an undeserved low grade:
[Consider] sex that is concededly nonconsensual, but is not ...
forced. [W]hatever falls into this category is, according to still-standard
definitions of rape found in most states' rape law, fully legal .... [One
example] is sex obtained through some sort of coercion .... A woman
who has sex with a professor in order to guarantee that she will receive
the grade she earned in his course has been coerced into sex, which again
may concededly be nonconsensual, but she has not been forced, and was
therefore not raped.23
The core of West's argument lies in what West means in saying that the
hypothetical student's decision to submit to sex with her professor can be
"conceded" to be nonconsensual. West means that although the student made a
deliberate decision to submit to sexual intercourse, her submission can be
"conceded" to be something she did not really want, in that she would have refused
it if she had not been threatened with an unfair grade. The fallacy in the argument
is the assumption that the student's counterfactual wishes, i.e., what she would
have chosen if the circumstances as she wished they had been, control whether she
legally consented to doing what she deliberately did. The counterfactual wishes of
a person who actually chooses sexual intercourse as the best she can do for herself
under the circumstances-and who does so under conditions of freedom that the
jurisdiction at hand regards as sufficient to enable her to take responsibility for her
245 (1989) (arguing that "rape should be defined as sex by compulsion, of which physical force is
one form"); Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method of the State, 8 SIGNS 635, 650-55
(1983); Robin West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442,
1459 (1993).
22 For a state that defines rape in terms of non-consent or force, see IOWA CODE § 709.1(1)
(2003) ("Any sex act between persons is sexual abuse by either of the persons when the act is
performed with the other person in any of the following circumstances: The act is done by force or
against the will of the other."). For commentators who argue that rape ought to be defined in terms of
non-consent or force, see McGregor, supra note 17, at 189-203; West, supra note 17, at 243-46.
23 West, supra note 17, at 239-40.
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choice-are wholly immaterial. What matters is that she actually chooses sexual
intercourse under conditions that the jurisdiction at hand regards as free of
wrongful force. That is what prescriptive consent to sexual intercourse is.
To be sure, perhaps jurisdictions should treat threats such as the professor's as
instances of wrongful "force" for purposes of sexual assault. 24 If they do, sexual
intercourse induced by such threats becomes intercourse both by wrongful force
and without legal consent. If they do not, however, sexual intercourse remains
intercourse without wrongful force and thus with legal consent. For, again, that is
what it means for a person to prescriptively consent to sexual intercourse in the
context of unwanted pressure: it means she deliberately submitted to sexual
intercourse as a result of pressures that she wishes were not present but that the
jurisdiction does not regard as wrongful means for inducing acquiescence to sexual
intercourse. Contrary to what West maintains, one cannot meaningfully say of a
person who reluctantly acquiesces to sexual intercourse in the face of unwanted
pressures, "She is not a victim of sexual intercourse by wrongful force, but she is a
victim of sexual intercourse without prescriptive consent.9
2 5
Now consider the contrary argument, that defining rape in terms of "non-
consent" is normatively deficient. Catharine MacKinnon and Robin West both
argue that an actor's mere use of force to achieve sexual intercourse ought to
render him guilty of rape, regardless of whether the woman consents to the
intercourse.26 This criticism comes in two distinct forms, but both rest on a
common fallacy-the fallacy that defining rape solely in terms of non-consent fails
to protect women from pressures from which they ought to be free. West argues
that in so far as consent is a defense to sexual intercourse by means of force, it
exonerates an actor who so frightens his victim with threats of death or mayhem
that she fearfully "consents" to sexual intercourse rather than risk being killed:
[T]he recent and notorious Texas case, in which a woman was found
to have consented to sex with a man who held a knife at her throat
because she pleaded with him to use a condom to avoid the risk of AIDS,
was such a case: There was undeniable force, but her rational, articulated
attempt to minimize harm to herself demonstrated her desire to
24 SCHULHOFER, supra note 20, at 197.
25 For courts that commit this fallacy, see North Carolina v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 475-76
(N.C. 1984) (dictum); Regina v. Olugboja, [1982] 1 QB 320 (Eng. C.A.). To be sure, it is not a
contradiction for a court to grade sexual offenses by defining a more serious offense as sexual
intercourse by force and without prescriptive consent, while defining the lesser as sexual intercourse
without prescriptive consent alone, provided that it is understood that the force that is needed to taint
consent for purposes of the higher offense (say, threats of physical harm) is different from the lesser
force that may suffice to taint consent for lesser offenses (say, force that overcomes a "no"). See 18
PA. CONST. STAT. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3124.1 (2001).
26 See MAcKiNNON, supra note 21, at 245; West, supra note 17, at 244.
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acquiesce, rather than risk great harm by fighting, and hence
demonstrated her consent.27
Unfortunately, West makes the same legal mistake as the Austin, Texas,
grand jury whose refusal to indict the "condom rapist" was later overturned: West
erroneously assumes that when a jurisdiction makes it a criminal offense to have
sexual intercourse by without "consent," the jurisdiction is using "consent" to refer
to factual consent, regardless of the threats by which it is elicited. In reality, when
jurisdictions make it a crime, without more, to have sexual intercourse without
"consent," they are using "consent" in a legal sense to refer to something she does
or experiences-including actually choosing sexual intercourse for herself-that
occurs under such conditions as the jurisdiction deems sufficient for the sexual
intercourse not to be a wrong to her. Otherwise, they would be taking the
unprecedented position that an actor who beats and maims a woman until she
yields, saying, "Just do what you want, but please don't hurt me any more,"
commits no sexual offense.
MacKinnon's argument against consent is more substantial. MacKinnon
argues that in so far as consent is a defense to pressures to engage in sexual
intercourse, consent legitimates a "sado-masochistic" model of sexual
intercourse. 28 MacKinnon believes that by making "consent" a defense, the law
legitimates sexual intercourse that is the product of social, economic, and political
pressures that cause women to choose sexual intercourse when it is contrary to
their interests and, worse yet, to cause women to regard the accompanying
pressures as acceptable and even desirable. 29 The fallacy in this argument does not
lie in MacKinnon's conception of the conditions under which women choose
sexual intercourse. Rather, it lies in her conception of legal consent. Suppose for a
moment that MacKinnon convinces lawmakers that they ought to protect women
from certain pressures to engage in sexual intercourse that women are now
socialized to regard as acceptable and even desirable. Suppose, further, that
lawmakers wish to codify that protection in a traditional way-that is, by
prohibiting actors from subjecting women to sexual intercourse without their
"consent." There is nothing in the nature of prescriptive consent that prevents
lawmakers from doing so. On the contrary, in order to prescriptively consent, a
woman's acquiescence to sexual intercourse must be sufficiently free, informed,
and competent to enable her to take responsibility in the eyes of the law for her
choice. A woman's choice is not "free" if it is the product of pressures that, in the
judgment of the jurisdiction at hand, unconditionally taint it, that is, pressures that
taint her choice even in the event that she welcomes them.30
27 West, supra note 17, at 238.
28 MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 172.
29 See CATHARINE MACINNON, SEX EQUALITY: RAPE 769, 779, 817-18, 839-40, 885-87
(2001).
30 Cf Regina v. Brown, [1993] 2 All E.R. 73 (H.L.) (Eng).
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To be sure, MacKinnon realizes that jurisdictions today refuse to treat general
social pressures on women as sufficient to invalidate the sexual acquiescence of
women who welcome the pressures. However, that is a feature not of the concept
of consent itself, but of the particular conceptions of consent that jurisdictions
currently embrace. No legal change can be won under any banner-whether under
the banner of "force" or "non-consent"--without first persuading jurisdictions to
alter their understanding of the kinds of pressure on women that are wrongful.
Once a jurisdiction is persuaded to change its norms, the norms can be fully
codified in terms of consent.
V. CONCLUSION
Analysis of the meaning of consent in rape cases is both difficult and
preliminary. Like all analysis, analysis of consent is difficult because the very
categories of thought that we bring to bear in analyzing our confusions are
themselves the source of our confusions. Yet such analysis is also preliminary
because it is a mere tool in service of the ultimate task of determining when sexual
intercourse is, and when it is not, a wrong from which women should be protected.
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